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I usually prefer to deal with rational people. Inthe vernacular, being rational means beingreasonable — that is, using reason when mak-
ing decisions, taking actions, and achieving goals.
Rational people tend to be more predictable and,
therefore, understandable. Understanding a deci-
sion makes it easier for me to accept it.
When I encounter and interact with agents on
the Web, or when my own agents encounter them,
I prefer that these agents behave rationally as well.
An agent can behave rationally in at least three
ways.  Some of these might be better than others;
some might be appropriate for individuals but not
for groups.
Rationality Types 
A rationality theory indicates what is rational and
what is not in specific cases. Three such theories
that govern an agent’s behavior are logical ratio-
nality, economic rationality, and pragmatic ratio-
nality. They depend, respectively, on the mathe-
matics of logic, probability, and computation. To
conform to their corresponding mathematical for-
malism, each type requires strong assumptions
about the nature of a rational agent’s world and
how the agent can sense and act in that world. 
Logical Rationality
In the fourth century BC, the Greek philosopher
Aristotle formulated a process for reasoning that
would lead to irrefutable conclusions. His system
of syllogisms (a kind of inference mechanism) could
produce not only new knowledge, but also a means
to achieve goals based on logically justified actions.
The resultant view — that reasoning could be
specified precisely and thus mechanized — evolved
in the early 20th century into the doctrine of logi-
cal positivism, which held that everything an agent
knows can be derived from observation sentences
that represent the agent’s environment. The deriva-
tions come from applying laws of deductive logic.
Deductive logic provides rational constraints on
belief in two ways. First, it can be used to define
the notion of deductive consistency and inconsis-
tency: deductive inconsistency determines a kind
of incoherence in belief. Second, the laws of de-
ductive logic can constrain admissible changes in
belief by providing deductive rules of inference. For
example, modus ponens is a deductive rule of
inference that requires Q to be inferred from sen-
tences P and P → Q.
So, to be logically rational, an agent “simply”
has to convert everything it senses into a sentence
(a belief) in a formal language, combine the sen-
tences with all other sentences it has sensed or
derived, derive new sentences about its world, and
use this new set of sentences to choose its actions.
Several major problems cloud this approach. First,
observations about the world might be uncertain and
incomplete, making them difficult to express logi-
cally. Second, several courses of action could lead to
a goal’s achievement, and it is difficult for logic to
help an agent decide among them. Third, there might
not be any action that an agent can prove will
achieve its goal, leaving the agent without help in
deciding what to do. Finally, reasoning about a large
set of sentences might be intractable.
Economic Rationality
Another option is for agents to be economically
rational.1 Like logically rational agents, economi-
cally rational ones act to achieve their goals on the
basis of what they know. Operationally, however,
an economically rational agent ranks possible
actions by the expected utility of their results and
then executes the action that has the highest
expected utility. (Expected utility is defined in
terms of the agent’s possible actions, the probabil-
ities of the actions’ outcomes, and the agent’s
ranked preferences among those outcomes.) Put
simply, economic rationality is based on decision
theory, which combines logic and probability the-
ory with utility theory to provide a means for mak-
ing decisions under uncertainty. 
Applying probability theory to ratio-
nality is attributed to the Reverend
Thomas Bayes (c. 1701–61).2 Bayesian
epistemology’s two main features are
the introduction of a formal apparatus
for inductive logic and the introduction
of a pragmatic self-defeat test for epis-
temic rationality as a way to extend
justification of the laws of deductive
logic to include inductive logic.3 The
formal apparatus adds standards of
probabilistic coherence and a rule of
probabilistic inference, both of which
apply to degrees of belief (degrees of
confidence). Bayesian decision theory
is now the dominant theoretical model
for both the descriptive and normative
analyses of decisions. 
Unfortunately, economic rationali-
ty requires a computationally expen-
sive search over the outcomes of all
possible sequences of actions (because
several actions might be needed to
achieve a goal), knowledge of the
probability distributions for the out-
comes (which are difficult to deter-
mine), and a means for assigning util-
ities to outcomes.4
Pragmatic Rationality
The earlier approaches to rationality
rely on the assumption that the world
will not significantly change while
the agent decides what to do, and that
an action that is rational when deci-
sion-making begins will be rational
when it concludes. Clearly, this is
problematic in real-world settings.
Imagine a car-driving agent waiting
at a stop sign. The agent looks both
ways, does not see any other vehicles,
and then, remembering that it
dropped its map, rummages on the
floor for several minutes to find it.
Finally, with map in hand, it deduces
from its observations that there are no
approaching vehicles and drives
blithely across the intersection.
Similarly, if proving that it was
safe to cross the intersection took
longer than the time for the traffic
status to change, the resultant proof
would be worthless. A pragmatic ap-
proach takes such computational lim-
itations into account. 
According to Stuart Russell and Peter
Norvig,2 this means doing “the right
thing.” Formally, they define this as “For
each possible percept sequence, a ratio-
nal agent should select an action that is
expected to maximize its performance
measure, given the evidence provided by
the percept sequence and whatever
built-in knowledge the agent has.”
When agents have limited abilities,
the best they can achieve is bounded
rationality. The ideal of logical or eco-
nomic rationality requires choosing
actions to maximize a measure of
expected utility. That utility should
reflect a complete and consistent pref-
erence order and probability measure
over all possible contingencies. This
requirement appears too strong to per-
mit an accurate specification for realis-
tic individual agent behavior.
We can weaken the ideal require-
ments for rationality in many ways.
Possibilities include anytime algorithms
that return the best action found each
time they terminate and theories that
attempt to mimic human decision mak-
ing. Because of the rich variety of psy-
chological types we can observe in
humans — each with different reason-
ing strengths and limitations  — it is
unlikely that there will be a single best
approach to pragmatic rationality.5
Rationality
and Multiagents
Rationality is important for groups of
agents as well. If all agents in a group
are individually rational, no matter
what type of rationality they use, will
the group necessarily behave rational-
ly? That is, will the group always make
the decisions, take the actions, and
achieve the goals that are best for it?
This question is important for govern-
ments, political organizations, corpo-
rations, teams, and committees.
An agent’s best strategy often
depends on what strategies other a-
gents choose. For each agent in a
group to behave rationally by maxi-
mizing its self-interest, for example, it
must consider the behaviors of other
agents who are also behaving in their
own self-interest. This consideration is
the basis of game theory, which pro-
vides mathematical guidance for how
agents in a multiagent system decide
their actions.
In open or continuous environ-
ments, deciding what is best depends
on a time horizon — it is usually
impractical for agents to reason infi-
nitely far into the future or to consid-
er an infinite number of intermediate
states. For a given finite time horizon,
an agent must choose a strategy that
considers either the consequences of
just the end result or the consequences
of both the ends and the means. When
the agents are part of a society, ethics
can provide some guidance.
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Figure 1. Rationality types and their major characteristics. Formal approaches
to rationality, such as logical and economic rationality, have severe limitations
when scaled up and applied in real-world domains. Theories of bounded ratio-
nality are more closely related to human reasoning and appear more promising




















The ethical theory egoism holds that action
should maximize self-interest. A parallel theory
called utilitarianism holds that action should
maximize the universal good of all agents. Both
theories consider only the end result (they are tele-
ological); they hold that the best thing to do is
always maximize a certain good, in which good
can be interpreted as pleasure, preference satis-
faction, interest satisfaction, or aesthetic ideals. In
contrast, deontological theories hold that the ends
do not justify the means, and agents must at each
step choose the action that does not endanger
society’s welfare.
Conclusion
Rationality alone is insufficient to specify agent
design. Using economic theory, we can program
agents to behave in ways that maximize their utili-
ty while responding to environmental changes.
However, economic models for agents, although
general in principle, are typically limited in practice
because the value functions that are tractable essen-
tially reduce an agent to acting selfishly.2 Building
a stable social system from a collection of agents
motivated by self-serving interests is difficult. 
Finally, understanding rationality and knowl-
edge requires interdisciplinary results from artifi-
cial intelligence, distributed computing, econom-
ics and game theory, linguistics, philosophy, and
psychology. A complete theory involves semantic
models for knowledge, belief, action, and uncer-
tainty; bounded rationality and resource-bounded
reasoning; commonsense epistemic reasoning; rea-
soning about mental states; belief revision; and
interactions in multiagent systems.
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